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History, whether as something told or as that which is the object of the telling, is routinely assumed to 
belong first and foremost to the domain of time and temporality. Yet routine though it may be, the 
assumption is nevertheless mistaken (at least on the usual and conventional understanding of what is 
meant by these latter notions1). Why and how it is mistaken is something I want to address here. In doing 
so, I will draw on a rethought conception of the temporal as well as the spatial, but it will not be the 
rethinking of time or space that will be central in my discussion. Rather than primarily concerning time, 
history, I shall argue, is essentially determined by place or topos, and it will be place, and the relation 
between place and history, as well as between place and time, that shall be my main focus – hence my 
title: topologies of history. 
I should note that the sense of topology I employ is one that derives from my own previous work 
on place,2 and is not the same as that sense of topology deployed by some geographers (for whom it is 
often set against ‘topography’3) or some historians and theorists of history – for instance, Philip J. 
Ethington, for whom topology appears as a form of cartographic practice and history a ‘mapping of the 
past’4 (the latter idea also appearing in John Lewis Gaddis’ work5). Moreover, if I use topology in the plural 
here, it is not because I see radically different forms of topology that belong to history, but because the 
very nature of the topological brings with it the idea of different elements and aspects that belong to the 
same landscape or terrain. One might well think of the different topological structures that I aim to explore 
here as contributing to a single topology or one may view them as offering different, though 
complementary, topologies – different passes over the same topos – each paying attention to a different 
feature or set of features: to boundedness, to materiality and commonality, to plurality and indeterminacy, 
and to narrativity.  
 
II. 
The basic claim that history arises only in place and is always shaped by the place, or places, in which it 
arises is to some extent a corollary of a more general claim to the effect that any and every appearance is 
tied to place. To be is to be placed, or as we may also say, being is being placed. Here the ontological 
primacy accorded to place has the important implication that place and displacement cannot be viewed as 
correlative notions. Displacement is not a sui generis concept, and to be displaced is not to be unplaced. 
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Displacement is thus itself a modification – a mode of – being placed. That to be is to be placed is a very 
old claim – it appears explicitly in the famous section in the fourth book of the Physics, in which Aristotle 
reasserts what he takes as the already familiar claim that ‘all things that exist are somewhere’ (and those 
things that are non-existent are nowhere)6 – and the claim is so basic that it is readily ignored or forgotten. 
Yet the claim is no less basic for being so often overlooked. 
As far as history is concerned, even a supposedly ‘global’ history is a history that emerges and is 
articulated in respect of specific places – it articulates a set of interconnections between or across places 
rather than somehow prescinding from place altogether (thus, in an artefact of its time, a patriotic imperial 
map from 1886, fig. 1, shows the globalised extent of the British Empire together with images that evoke 
the many different places that are drawn together within it). Similarly, those forms of history that appear 
to focus on political or economic events and processes are always underlain by the places – including the 
meeting rooms, trading floors, offices, debating chambers, halls, and corridors – in which those events and 
processes play out, and by the places that hold the memory of them. The belonging of history to place is 
indeed what constitutes history as history – every history is ‘of a place’ – and this belonging is evident in 
and through the way history addresses and articulates elements and structures that are evident in the 
place to which that history belongs. It is this belonging to place that distinguishes history from fiction – 
even though fiction may be inspired by or derive its materials from some place; even though there is 
always some place out of which fiction arises; and even though fiction may celebrate, evoke, or give voice 
to place; still fiction does not belong to place in the same way history so belongs.  
That history and place are tied together is not, of course, a new idea. Contemporary theorists such 
as Ethington aside, it is already present in the work, for instance, of Lucien Febvre, whose 1922 work, La 
Terre et l'évolution humaine7 stands so much under the influence of the regionalist thinking of Paul Vidal 
de la Blanche, and whose work, together with that of Marc Bloch, gave rise to the Annales School, and so 
also to the geographically-inflected history of Fernand Braudel. Yet what it might mean to talk of history 
and place belonging together depends very much on what place itself is taken to mean. This is an even 
more important issue given the supposed ‘spatial turn’ in contemporary theory. It might well be supposed 
that the idea that place and history are tied together is itself the consequence of the turn towards a 
spatialised mode of thinking. So far as French thought is concerned, there is some truth to this supposition, 
but mainly because French lacks the same distinction between space and place that occurs in English. 
The French espace is already somewhat ambiguous between space and place, which is why 
Febvre’s work cannot be rendered into English in a way that takes it straightforwardly to prioritise the 
spatial and why Bachelard’s topological poetics appears in French as La poétique de l'espace (its English 
translation as ‘poetics of space’, while not inaccurate, can also mislead). Whereas French thinking about 
both space and place has tended to be encompassed by the term l'espace, as well as terms such as lieu, 
territoire, pays, and so the term has been genuinely equivocal in the concepts to which it refers English 
presents a rather different state of affairs. To begin with, English, like German, but unlike French, does 
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indeed possess distinct terms that allow for a clearer differentiation between space and place (or in 
German, Raum and Ort/Ortschaft), and so talk of a spatial turn is not, just in virtue of being a turn to space, 
also a turn to place. In fact, within contemporary spatialised thinking in English, place is almost invariably 
treated either as a problematic term to be discarded in preference for the spatial or else as a concept that 
is readily subsumable under the spatial – place is thus viewed as a qualified form of space, as ‘humanised’ 
space, ‘meaningful’ space, or even ‘subjective’ space. 
What grounds any genuine topology of history, one that does not reduce, for instance, to a mere 
spatialization (which is what occurs when place is reduced to simple location or position), has to be a 
properly sui generis concept of place. Consequently, a crucial step in the elaboration of such a topology is 
the clarification of that grounding concept, and a good deal of what I have to say here, at least to begin 
with, will focus on such clarification. 
 
III. 
From the outset it is important to be clear that that despite the common tendency to think otherwise, and 
notwithstanding the fact that place and space are related notions, place is indeed neither simply reducible 
to nor derivable from space. Consequently, and despite the fact that this is one of the senses that is 
attached to the concept, place can indeed not be identified with mere ‘spatial location’. Instead, what lies 
at the heart of the concept of place is the notion of bound, and, with it, surface. 
The linking of bound with surface is significant, since it indicates the asymmetrical character of 
bound – especially evident in the understanding of bound as horizon. It is this asymmetrical character that 
underlies the difference between, for instance, inner and outer (an asymmetry dramatically presented in 
Jacobus Vrel’s 1650 painting, Woman at a Window, Waving at a Girl – fig.2), and that also marks off bound 
proper from any mere demarcation (in which there is no essential difference between what lies on each 
side of the demarcating line, and which is therefore both spatial and arbitrary). In Aristotle, this is captured 
in the character of place or topos as the innermost boundary of that which surrounds – the place is the 
surface of what bounds as it faces inward to what is bounded (in much the same way as the horizon only 
appears from within the field that it bounds) (see fig 3). 
Inasmuch as it bounds, so place gives 'room' – an aspect of place that is evident in the way 
another Greek term that is also linked to place, chora (the term is connected to both the dance and the 
place for dancing, echoed in the English 'chorus' and 'choreography'), is taken by Plato to refer to the 
receptacle or matrix (the 'womb') out of which things come into being or presence.  The way the character 
of place as bounding is tied to its character as open, as giving room (in much the way that the enclosed 
character of a civic square gives room for the events and activities that take place within it – see fig. 4)   
reflects the way space as openness can be said to arise out of place. Indeed, the modern idea of space as 
isotropic extension (extension that has the same properties in all directions) can be understood as an 
extrapolation from the idea of the openness that is given within bounds – it is that same openness but 
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with its bounds removed. Whether one can genuinely conceive openness in this latter fashion – openness 
as released from all bounds – other than in a purely formal or abstract manner, is an important question. If 
one focuses just on the idea of openness as such, then it seems easy to think of such openness as always 
capable of further extension, and in this way to extend the idea of an openness within bounds to an 
openness that exists outside of any such bounds. One might thus be led to say that there is nothing within 
the concept of openness that implies its boundedness, but that such boundedness only becomes evident 
once one recognises the dependence of openness on that which opens, and so on that which bounds. Yet 
although it may well be said that openness seems not to carry within it any sense of bound, and so to allow 
an expansion into an openness that is without bounds, still this is indeed to think of openness in a way that 
obscures the real character of openness – that forgets its real origin in the placed and the bounded.   
 
IV. 
Since it is in the placed and the bounded, and only thus, that any being, any presence, any appearance is 
possible, then so it is only in the placed and the bounded that history and the historical appears also. This 
is true of history as it is the product of historians and of history as that which is studied by historians. In 
hermeneutic terms, this point underlies the idea that historical phenomena are always presented from 
within some contextual frame or situation, but this way of putting things can all too easily be construed as 
a point about the purely interpretative presentation of historical phenomena, and the placed and bounded 
character of historical appearance applies even prior to any explicit act of interpretation. Indeed, 
hermeneutics itself, which should not be construed as identical with any theory merely of interpretation as 
usually conceived, concerns the placed character of appearing as such, which means that hermeneutics is 
ontological (or better, topological) before it is ‘epistemological’ (and this reflects the close connection 
between hermeneutics in its Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian incarnations, and phenomenology). 
Hence the claim that all history belongs first and foremost to a place – both as it is the history of that place 
and as it is written from out of the place of the historian herself. This means that there can be no such 
thing as a complete or genuinely universal history. Every history is ‘parochial’. Such parochialism is not a 
deficiency, however, but rather reflects the enabling condition of history, namely, its being placed, and so 
also its being bounded. 
Kant makes a distinction, though not always consistently deployed, between bounds and limits – 
between Grenze and Schranke.8 Of knowledge, he claims that it admits of limits, but not of bounds. What 
he means is that although knowledge recognises that which lies outside it (and which may even be said to 
enable its possibility), knowledge itself can never achieve any inner completion – it has no limit that it 
recognises in its own terms. What is at issue in Kant is the same point that is at issue in the idea that 
boundedness enables openness, which is to say that there is a form of limit that enables the surpassing of 
limit.  Put differently, one might say that even the unlimited begins its appearing from somewhere, but 
one should add that this is what is evident, experientially and phenomenologically, in the character of any 
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and every place as always having within it an inexhaustible potential for appearance. There is no ‘inner 
limit’ to a place. 
In thus being bound to place, and, therefore being also bounded, history is not somehow 
diminished or unduly restricted. The lack of ‘inner limit’ means that through its boundedness history is 
opened to an ineradicable plurality and indeterminacy. No place has only one history that belongs to it, 
even though not every history that may be told of a place properly belongs to that place. Places never 
appear alone and apart – every place is embedded within and with respect to other places, and every 
place has embedded other places within it (rather like the images in Paolini’s picture gallery – see fig.5). 
Histories, like places, only ever appear in the plural – for there to be one history is also for there to be 
many histories (which does not licence the claim that anything that purports to be a history is so).
 History to one side, however, it is to some extent the lack of inner limit that sustains the notion of 
an unbounded openness expressed in the idea of space as a mode of unlimited extension (or at least of a 
mode of extension that has no limit that belongs essentially to it). Yet this latter sense of space is a purely 
formal or abstract concept rather than a concrete or material one – it involves the transformation of 
openness in its character as always allowing a further opening within it into the levelled-out openness of 
pure extension. The more space is identified with such a notion of extension (it is important to note that 
such an identification represent just one way of understanding space, and not the only such way), then the 
more space is construed as purely formal, and in being so construed, is also understood as essentially 
quantitative in character – as measurable and calculable. It is this formalised idea of space, particularly as 
articulated through geometrical and mathematical conceptions, that has largely come to dominate 
modern thinking – for which it may even be said to provide the foundation – and that has also come to 
over-ride any sui generis notion of place (which remains qualitative rather than quantitative).  As a result, 
place tends to be viewed under the sway of formalised notion of space, and so place is understood as a 
point in space – a simple location – or as an arbitrary region enclosed by a set of such points. 
It is significant that in the loss of the distinction between place and space, it is not space that 
tends to disappear (even though it does take on a narrower and more abstracted form), but place. Yet as 
place is tied to the notion of bound, so in the loss of the distinction between place and space – in the 
submersion, in other words, of place into space (or into a mode of space, namely space as extension) – we 
also lose any sense of the proper bound of space whether as that applies to the concept or to space and 
spatiality as such. Space becomes boundless as it also becomes placeless. It is precisely the almost 
complete disappearance of any genuine notion of place in the contemporary world – and the fact that any 
sense of its continuation is rendered uncertain and problematic – that signals the loss of any genuine 
sense of bound, whether in relation to the thinking of space or indeed in relation to thinking as such.  This 
loss of bound, and its recovery, is central to what concerns me here – it is central to the inquiry into place, 
but it is also at stake in any and every inquiry into the relation between concepts, no matter what they 
may be, in any and every inquiry into relation, no matter the elements related. To inquire into the bounds 
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of concepts is to inquire into what distinguishes them, and what connects them. In the case of place, as 
well as time and space, the loss of the bounds that belong to these concepts is also a loss of any sense of 
their proper distinction and connection – a loss that comes along with the increasing dominance of space 
as extension over both place but also over time. 
 
V. 
Although it is often said that time, as well as history, dominates the thinking of modernity, the reality is 
that spatialization is the dominant mode by which modernity (which includes modern technology and 
contemporary technologized capital) reproduces and represents itself. Modernity, one might say, is 
essentially spatialising, and it is a spatialization that operates apart from any recognition of the prior 
embeddedness of space in place (this mode of spatialisation is what underlies both the economistic and 
digital nature of the contemporary world). It is thus a form of unbounded spatialization (and this is the 
heart of the critique of modernity to be found in Heidegger as well as Camus, and, though the connection 
to space is not always explicit, in a range of other thinkers). The prioritisation of space is present, however, 
even in many of those modern forms of thought that appear to prioritise time simply because the mode of 
time that is so prioritised is the time of succession or duration – both of which, as Heidegger points out 
(and Bergson only half sees) are spatialised modes of time. 
The idea that time and history are the dominant forms by which modernism articulates itself is 
thus, for the most part, a myth. But the dominance of spatialised models of time is not peculiar to 
modernity alone, even though such spatialised thinking does reflect a characteristic feature of modernity. 
Part of what is at work here is also something Kant notes, namely, the character of representation, 
including the representation of time, as always spatialised. Space is the form of representation, and so it is 
also the form by which time is represented also (although the character of what space is as it is relevant 
here should not be assumed as already determined). This has the consequence that even were one to 
suppose that time were the primary concern of history, that in which it has its origin, still the form of 
history, at least of history as given in the work of the historian, would necessarily be a spatialised form just 
inasmuch as history is itself representational in character – just inasmuch as it does indeed aim to speak 
about history and the historical. That ‘aboutness’ is at the heart of the representational, and that 
‘aboutness’ already presupposes a dimensionality within which it operates (‘intentionality’ is in this respect 
already a spatialised and topological notion – as one might expect give that it is, fundamentally, a form of 
directedness towards). 
Yet although history cannot escape the spatialised mode of time that is at work in representation, 
and this spatialised mode also reflects what is the commonplace mode by which time is understood, this 
does not mean that time is only to be understood as reducible to spatiality. If the openness within bounds 
is what underlies the idea of space, it is the dynamic character of this openness, its opening, that underlies 
the idea of time, and that also provides the key to a genuine understanding of time – one that does not 
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reduce it to space. On such an understanding, time is place understood in its dynamic or (to draw on an 
idea at the centre of Claude Romano’s thinking of the event9) adventual character, and so in its character 
as an opening, a presencing, a happening – and not a happening in time (which would again convert time 
to a mode of space), but a happening that is time. It is this ‘happening’ that itself allows the opening to 
time understood spatially – that is, to time as it might appear as a stretched-out series of objectified 
events – and so also to the idea of time as time as it might be given in the idea of a past that lies behind us 
or a future that lies ahead.10 
Significantly the most important attempts to rethink time within modernity, notably Proust’s A la 
recherche du temps perdu11 and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit,12 both attempt to do so by means of place. It is 
thus that Proust’s work, which aims to recover time through a retrieval of memory is so obsessed with 
place and the inter-relation of place and person – something made especially clear in George Poulet’s 
L’éspace proustienne.13 Heidegger’s ‘kairotic’ conception of time, which does indeed understand time as 
adventual – or, in Heidegger’s terms, as ekstatic and originary  – is such that Heidegger could himself say, 
though only much later in 1942, that whilst in Sein and Zeit, time, chronos, is the “fore-word” for being, 
chronos must itself be  understood as a mode of topos.14 Here topos appears in its in own character as 
adventual, and so as presencing, in a way that brings it into direct conection with the Heideggerian ideas of 
the Ereignis or Event, the Lichtung or Clearing, and the Geviert or Fourfold.15 In denying that history is 
primarily about time, what I am thus denying is that history has anything to do with time as it is ordinarily 
understood – time as succession or duration, time as spatialised, time as something apart from place. 
 
VI. 
In as much as history is concerned with time, and there is indeed a sense in which it is so, then it is with 
time as an aspect of place. And this remains true even though the articulation of place in its temporality 
typically takes the form of narration, and so inevitably results in a form of spatialization of the temporal – 
yet a spatialization that properly is not separable from place; a spatialization that can indeed remain within 
the frame of the topological. In belonging to place, even the spatialization of time that occurs through 
narration remains determined by the bounds within which it arises. The spatialised time of narration is 
thus still a ‘placed’ time. It is a time whose appearance as succession arises only out of the time that 
belongs to place – out of the opening of place – as is evident through the way in which such narratives are 
indeed narratives of the place. 
The very structure of place is already a narrative or proto-narrative structure.16 This may seem a 
bold claim given the frequency with which it has been asserted, especially within the theory of history over 
recent times, that narrative is always something imposed rather than found. Narrative has all too often 
been viewed as subjective ‘construction’, and in the case of history, as a function of its ‘literary’ character. 
This has been the claim, not only of Hayden White and Louis Mink, 17 but of many others (and significantly, 
Ed Casey once made the same claim in relation to place itself, asserting that narrative is subjective in a way 
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that place is not).18 Similarly Frank Ankersmitt’s attempt to regain a sense of connection to immediate 
historical experience has been accompanied by a desire to escape narrativity, and with it the ‘prison-
house’, as he calls it following Nietzsche, of language.19 The antagonism towards the linguistic that is 
evident in Ankersmitt’s recent work is part of a more widespread tendency, one that underlies the critique 
of narrativity, to view language, to which narrative is seen as tied, as itself subjective or, at least, as always 
standing between us and the world, including the world to which the historian aims to gain access. 
As far as language is concerned, it is important to note, however, that language belongs, not to 
the subject alone, but rather to the ‘between’ of subject and world. As such, one might say that 
subjectivity, like objectivity too, is a function of language rather than the reverse. This should be a familiar 
enough point to any serious reader of the hermeneutic tradition, and especially of Heidegger and 
Gadamer.20 But it is also a point evident in the work of thinkers in the analytic tradition such as Davidson 
(or even Brandom and McDowell).21 The problem with viewing language as some sort of subjective 
imposition onto the world is that, as Davidson himself points out, there is no way of characterising either 
the world or language independently of one another such that one could give genuine content to the idea 
of a wholesale separation of language from world.22 One can certainly distinguish words from the things 
they designate or purport to designate, and sentences from what those sentences aim to speak about, but 
such capacity to distinguish arises only within language, and with respect to parts of language, rather than 
properly pertaining to language as a whole.  Language, to put the matter hermeneutically, is that which 
opens up the world, rather than closing it off – which is to reinforce the point of its belonging to the 
‘between’ (which is the kernel of the argument, perhaps first and most notably advanced by Wittgenstein, 
against scepticism23).  
The character of language as enabling the opening of the world, and as belonging to the ‘between’ 
of self and world, is also to draw attention to the intimate relation of language to place. Both ‘opening’ and 
‘between’ are essentially topological notions, as are so many of the ideas that come to the fore in the 
attempt to speak of the fundamental structures of our being in the world, or, indeed in the very attempt to 
speak of being or presence. Place and language thus begin together, and the emergence of the two, which 
is also the emergence of the world, is an emergence that gives rise to the complex relationality of place 
that is itself what is given more specific articulation in (and as) narrative.24  
The forms of narrative are many and are not restricted to those highly literary forms of narrative 
that have often taken the attention of historians. And this means too that the forms of historical narrative 
are much greater than is often assumed. Historical narrative is not an additional narrative form that stands 
apart from other narratives, but rather it is a form of narrative that itself depends upon and encompasses 
other, often more basic, forms. The simplest and most obvious narratives are narratives of movement, of 
passage from one place to another, whether long or short, whether in relation to the near or the far. 
Narrative also arises in relation to action – itself a form of movement. There the most basic narrative is 
that which makes an action intelligible as action by locating that action within a frame in which the action, 
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and the movement in which it is embodied, can be discerned as having a particular direction and trajectory 
described in terms of the orientation of the agent in the world (fig 6). The connection to movement is 
important: narrative is essentially just the making explicit of a making way, of a passage or progress, that 
occurs within or between. The way action is tied to narrative is particularly well-expressed in the idea, 
originating with Elizabeth Anscombe and developed by Donald Davidson, of action ‘under a description’.25 
Thus an event is revealed as an action through the way that event falls under an appropriate description. 
What is at work in this idea of ‘description’ is a minimal form of narration, since the description operates 
by locating the event at issue in relation to a larger orienting frame. Such modes of narration are not 
impositions onto the event being described, but rather draw attention to features of that event as such. 
The way a narrative connects to an event in this way cannot be at the level merely of some 
abstract or merely general characterisation. If a narrative is indeed ‘of’ the place, then it must be a 
narrative that belongs to the materiality of that place, is evident in it, and can be drawn from it – almost 
akin to Thomas’ demand to feel Christ’s wounds if he is to be persuaded of the risen Christ’s presence 
before him (fig 7). To put the point evidentially and epistemologically, that which grounds narration is the 
same as that which grounds any and every claim of the historian – it must, in Collingwood’s words, “be 
something here and now perceptible to [the historian]: this written page, this spoken utterance, this 
building, this fingerprint”.26 Collingwood’s point should not be construed, at least not as applied here, 
simply as a point about the inevitable grounding of history – as knowledge of the past – in the present, but 
rather concerns the way past and present, as well as future, are given through and emerge out of place, 
which is also to say, out of the complex materiality of place. This is not to say that narrative – of history - 
can directly be read off a place on any first or superficial encounter. But then, one cannot do that even 
with a page of written text or a set of spoken words – even the text that we read or interpret, seemingly 
‘without thinking’, is a text whose reading and interpretation has already been prepared for by prior 
familiarity and learning. The same is true of all reading, including the reading of a place, a thing, a story. 
For a narrative to belong to a place or a thing is for it to be readable from that place or thing, and such 
reading must arise out of the materiality of what is given. That means that, contrary to the oft-repeated 
claim, places and things have beginnings and endings no less than they have other features and properties 
– as a sword can have an edge, as an oak can arise from an acorn, as a human being can die. Even those 
generic forms into which more literary narratives may be categorised and whose shape they may follow 
are not, if they have any genuine connection with those places and things whose narratives they are, 
cannot be merely impositions onto those places and things, but must indeed connect with their material 
presence. 
Indeed, both memory and emotional content should be understood as themselves embedded, not 
in some abstracted subjectivity, but as also given in the materiality of place and thing, and in the engaged 
inter-relation of agents in the world. This is one reason why work in the history of the emotions so often 
moves towards the direct thematization of place and materiality – a point made very evident in works such 
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as Andy Wood’s The Memory of the People,27 and which is also instantiated, though rather differently, in 
Pierre Nora’s earlier and encyclopedia Lieux de mémoire28 (to cite but two notable examples). There can 
be no inquiry into emotion, just as there can be no inquiry into memory either, that does not attend to the 
intimate belonging of emotion and memory to place, to locale, and the material forms of life and activity, 
and this reflects what is often referred to as the ‘extended’ character of cognition and experience as this 
has developed within empirical cognitive science. It is that extendedness, which is to say the materiality of 
the cognitive and experiential, that itself makes history possible, just as it also makes possible forms of 
collective memory and experience, and underlies, though in different ways, personal memory, experience 
and agency also.29  Once again, however, this emphasis on materiality does not itself entail, even though it 
is often taken in this way,  a  mode of access to the world, including to the past, that somehow stands 
outside of, even prior to, the linguistic and the discursive. To assume that it does is not only to 
misunderstands the non-subjective character of language, but also to misunderstand, or perhaps simply to 
forget, the way language and discursivity are themselves given materially (fig 8) – in script, sign, shape, 
sound, and voice – a point that is a consequence, or, one might say, is itself bound up with, the intimate 
belonging together of language and place to which I have alluded already. 
 
VII.  
I noted earlier that the fundamental ontological character of place means that displacement is always 
secondary to being-placed. Displacement is a modification or mode of being placed, and indeed, inasmuch 
as place is itself dynamic or adventual in character – as it is an opening as well as openness – so every 
instance of being-placed will also have something of the character of a displacement also. Place, and 
being-placed, is not a static, but a mobile condition – boundedness itself only becomes evident in and 
through movement, and boundedness is above all effective in movement. This has several important 
consequences that are especially significant for the understanding of history.  
Although history cannot be taken as determined solely by time or the temporal as usually 
understood, historical inquiry is fundamentally oriented toward and determined by place in its 
adventuality. What this means is that history is also oriented towards precisely the way place is 
characterised by its own mobility, its own constantly mobile and so displacing tendency. It is this that is 
evident, to allude to Ankersmitt’s emphasis on historical experience, to the way historical inquiry, but 
memory too, is characterised in terms of the encounter with loss, and, I would add, with facticity (the two 
being necessarily given together).  It is this experience that lies at the heart of the adventual which is 
precisely a mode of beginning out of what is already given, even as it opens to the new, but as an opening 
towards is also an opening away from, and so necessarily brings with a sense of loss of what has gone 
before, even though it may also be accompanied, at least potentially, by hope for what might now emerge 
(see fig 9). What this draws attention to is indeed the character of being-placed, in its adventuality, as 
always a form of displacement into the world. Our contemporary situation, and with it, the situation of 
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much of the last hundred or more years, in which it is often said that displacement is the primary 
phenomenon, is thus no different in this regard than any other historical situation. The role of 
displacement in being-placed, and so of loss, and the possibility of hope, is an essential and inevitable one. 
If there is a difference, it is not that displacement has itself displaced being-placed (clearly an 
impossibility), but rather that being-placed has itself become something effaced, forgotten, or sometimes 
simply denied. The world is thus increasingly ordered as if it were merely an undifferentiated space, even 
though that very ordering itself operates only in and through place. 
 
VIII. 
Near the start of this talk, I made brief reference to the work of Philip Ethington and John Lewis Gaddis. 
Ethington explicitly talks of boundary as a key notion, as well as employing the idea of ‘topology’, and both 
draw upon notions of space, place, landscape and mapping in their treatments of historical inquiry. The 
idea of history as a kind of mapping enterprise has a certain usefulness, but it is important to note that 
mapping is not what is at issue in the topologies of history that I have begun to sketch here. One of the 
reasons for this is simple: not only does the map represent a particular form of spatialization, but it also 
fails to address the adventual character of place that is itself so fundamental. Moreover, it also offers little 
or no insight into the way history is indeed tied to place, not only in its adventuality and narrativity, but 
also its relationality and materiality. In connecting history with the enterprise of cartography, both 
Ethington and Gaddis seem to have in mind standard forms of 2-dimensional planar mapping of a 
landscape or terrain. But not all maps or charts are like this. Portolan charts (fig 10) show salient landmarks 
within sets of radiating compass points and lines of distance for purposes of maritime navigation. Such 
charts are not directed at mapping a landscape but are highly specific practical instruments for the 
management and direction of seaborne movement. Perhaps the maps that are closest to historical 
accounts are those that those that record routeways or lines of journey – a notable example being those in 
John Ogilvy’s 1675 Britannia Atlas (fig 11). Here the map follows a line through a landscape and so through 
a succession of towns, villages and other landmarks. The map shows a journey, and as such, it might be an 
attempt at a visual narrative in a way that most other forms of maps are not (even though they can be 
used in the service of narrative). 
Whatever view we take on this matter, however, Ethington’s and Gaddis’ use of the idea of history 
as a mapping raises a question that may be thought to have lain in the background of much of my 
discussion: to what extent is talk of topology and place in relation to metaphorical? Ethington and Gaddis 
both talk of metaphor in the context of their own treatments of these matters, and there is a widespread 
tendency to treat talk of place, as well as space, in many different contexts (and such talk is ubiquitous 
even when place and space are not directly thematized) as indeed metaphorical. Certainly, in my own 
discussion, neither place nor space, nor any related terms, are intended metaphorically, and to suppose 
that they are so intended would be to undermine any sense that might attach to the claims being 
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advanced.  Metaphor is commonly taken to involve a carrying-across (metaphora from metapherein) of a 
term from one domain to another, but this way of understanding metaphor always depends on a contrast 
between the literal and the metaphorical, so that when used metaphorically a term no longer means what 
it usually means – though the nature of such metaphorical meaning is difficult to clarify. Once one 
recognises the ontological primacy of place, one must think the very concept of place, and can no longer 
assume access to some ready notion of what place might be as metaphorical or even as literal. What 
actually emerges here is a questionability that attaches to the very contrast between the metaphorical and 
the literal and that becomes strikingly evident in relation to place partly because of the fundamental and 
ubiquitous nature of the concept. If the thinking of place at work here is construed in any way as 
‘metaphorical’, then it is not in the sense of a movement away from the ‘literal’ or the ‘real’, but rather a 
turn towards the capacity of the image itself to open up a place in which, in this inquiry, place itself – and 
history too - stands more clearly revealed.        
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